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Abstract—Physical consequences to power systems of false data
injection cyber-attacks are considered. Prior work has shown that
the worst-case consequences of such an attack can be determined
using a bi-level optimization problem, wherein an attack is chosen
to maximize the physical power flow on a target line subsequent
to re-dispatch. This problem can be solved as a mixed-integer
linear program, but it is difficult to scale to large systems due
to numerical challenges. Three new computationally efficient
algorithms to solve this problem are presented. These algorithms
provide lower and upper bounds on the system vulnerability
measured as the maximum power flow subsequent to an attack.
Using these techniques, vulnerability assessments are conducted
for IEEE 118-bus system and Polish system with 2383 buses.
I. INTRODUCTION
With integration of real-time monitoring, sensing, communi-
cation and data processing, electric power systems are becom-
ing increasingly efficient and intelligent. However, similar to
all computer network integrated systems, this integration also
makes power systems more vulnerable to cyber attacks which
could result in serious physical consequences or even system
failure. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate system vulnerability
to credible attacks before they happen, and develop techniques
to detect potential attacks and protect the system.
False data injection (FDI) involves a malicious adversary re-
placing a subset of measurements with counterfeits. It has been
shown that FDI attacks can be designed to target system states
[1], [2], [3], system topology [4], [5], generator dynamics [6],
and energy markets [7]. Some of these involve designing an
optimization problem to determine the worst-case FDI attacks
that can cause line overflow [8], operating cost change [9],
[10], or locational marginal price change [11]. However, the
results are only demonstrated for small systems. Similar to
[8], we consider an optimization problem to determine the
worst-case FDI attack that causes line overflow, but our goal
is to design optimization algorithms that scale to significantly
larger systems (i.e. thousands of buses).
In [8], an FDI attack against state estimation (SE) that leads
to an overflow is introduced. Subsequent to the attack, the
system operator re-dispatches the system generation, leading
to an overload on a target line. Modeling such attacks leads
to formulation of a bi-level optimization problem in which
the first level models the attacker’s ability and limitations
while the second level models the system response via optimal
power flow (OPF). This bi-level optimization problem is re-
formulated to a single level mixed-integer linear problem
(MILP) by replacing the second level by its Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions and rewriting the non-convex com-
plementary slackness conditions as mixed integer constraints.
As the system size scales, this optimization problem be-
comes hard to solve because of the increasing number of
constraints as well as number of binary variables. But the
recent cyber attack in Ukraine (see [12]) reminds us that it
is imperative to characterize the vulnerability of large power
systems. To this end, we introduce three computationally effi-
cient algorithms to characterize the vulnerability of systems. In
some cases, these algorithms give the optimal attack. In other
cases, finding the optimal attack is intractable, so instead these
algorithms provide lower and upper bounds on the optimal
objective value. A lower bound represents a feasible solution,
and thus, highlights a specific overflow vulnerability for the
system. An upper bound, on the other hand, constitutes a limit
on the severity of this class of attacks.
The first algorithm provides the optimal solution to the
problem by reducing the number of line thermal limit con-
straints as well as the binary variables associated with them.
The second algorithm further reduces the number of generation
limit constraints and corresponding binary variables. However,
by doing this we give up a guarantee on optimality, so the
algorithm only provides a lower bound on the objective.
The third algorithm provides both a lower bound and an
upper bound via linear programming (LP) that maximizes
the difference between target line cyber and physical power
flows. All three algorithms are tested on the IEEE 118-bus
system and the Polish system (2383 buses) to evaluate system
vulnerability.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Sec. II, power
system state estimation and the attack model are described.
Sec. III describes how to formulate the bi-level optimization
problem and how to convert it to a MILP, while Sec. IV in-
troduces three algorithms to solve such optimization problem.
Simulation results and concluding remarks are presented in
Sec. V and VI, respectively.
II. STATE ESTIMATION AND ATTACK MODEL
In this section, we introduce the mathematical formulation
for SE and the attack model. Throughout, we assume there are
nb buses, nbr branches, ng generators, and nm measurements
in the system. For tractability, we focus on the DC power flow
model and DC SE, but the attacks introduced in this paper can
also be performed against AC SE as in [8].
A. State Estimation
The DC measurement model is described as
z = Hx+ e (1)
where z is the nm × 1 measurement vector whose entries
are measurements of the system; x is the vector of bus
voltage angles; H denotes the nm × nb matrix describing the
relationship between the system states and measurements; e
is the nm × 1 measurement error vector, whose entries are
assumed to be independent and Gaussian distributed with zero
mean and covariance matrix R = diag(σ21 , σ22 , ..., σ2nm).
Observability analysis is performed before the state estima-
tion process to check whether the system is fully observable.
The weighted least-square (WLS) method is utilized to solve
the SE problem, and the solution is given by [1]
xˆ = (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1z (2)
where xˆ is the estimated system state vector. We assume
classical bad data detection, based on measurement residuals,
is used to detect large errors in measurement data. Note that
traditional bad data detectors cannot necessarily detect FDI
attacks. Indeed, unobservable attacks, as defined below, cannot
be detected by any bad data detector based on measurement
residuals.
B. Attack Model
We first assume that the attacker has the following knowl-
edge and capabilities:
1) The attacker has full system topology information via
power transfer distribution factors (PTDF).
2) The attacker has knowledge of load distribution, genera-
tion costs and line thermal limits of the system.
3) The attacker has control of the measurements in a subset
S of the network.
As discussed in [8], in the absence of noise, an attack is
defined to be unobservable when there exists an nb× 1 attack
vector c 6= 0 such that for all i, the measurement z¯i modified
by the attacker satisfies z¯i = zi+Hic, where Hi denotes the ith
row of H . Given an attacker with control of the measurements
in S, it can execute this attack with attack vector c if Hic has
non-zero entries only in S.
Given an attack vector c, the following procedure produces
a subgraph S that, if controlled by the attacker, can execute
an unobservable attack. For an attack vector c, load buses
(i.e., buses with load) corresponding to non-zero entries of c
are denoted as center buses. Given an attacker vector c, the
subgraph S controlled by the adversary is constructed using
the following algorithm introduced in [3]:
1) Let S be the set of all center buses.
2) Extend S by including all branches and buses adjacent
to center buses.
3) If any bus on the boundary of S is a non-load bus (i.e.,
no load is present), extend S by including all adjacent
branches and buses to this bus.
4) Repeat step 3) until all boundary buses are load buses.
Constructing S with this method ensures that only measure-
ments inside S can be modified by the attacker. The system
operator will see the results of this unobservable attack as
load changes at load buses within S, while the total load of
the system remain unchanged.
III. WORST-CASE LINE OVERFLOW ATTACKS
In [8], a bi-level optimization problem is introduced to
find the worst-case unobservable line overflow attack vector
given the attacker’s limited resources to change states. In
the optimization problem, the first level models the attacker’s
objective to maximize the power flow on a target line, subject
to constraints on (1) the attacker’s resources, characterized
by the number of center buses in c, and (2) the attacker’s
detectability, characterized by the load shift, or the difference
between the cyber load and the original load, as a percentage
of the original load. The second level is a DCOPF problem
simulating the system response to the attack. It is demonstrated
in [8] that unobservable attacks solved with the MILP can
successfully lead to generation re-dispatch that maximize
physical power flow on the target line, and hence, can result
in line overflow for IEEE RTS 24-bus system.
In [8], B-θ method is used to fomulate the DCOPF problem,
where the line power flow is calculated as the product of
the dependency matrix of power flow and voltage angle B
and the voltage angle vector θ. In contrast, in this paper we
equivalently formulate the DCOPF using PTDF, where the line
power flow is calculated as the product of PTDF matrix and
power injection. Note that in this formulation, the variable
vector θ is eliminated, and hence, the thermal limit constraints
become independent of each other. Without loss of generality,
we assume the power flow on the target line is positive. If it
is not, we just maximize the negative of it.
The bi-level optimization problem is formulated as follows:
(dual variables for second level problem are written in paren-
theses)
maximize
c
Pl − σ ‖c‖1 (3)
subject to
P = PTDF(GBP ∗G − PD) (4)
‖c‖1 6 N1 (5)
− LSPD 6 Hc 6 LSPD (6)
{P ∗G} = arg
{
min
PG
CG (PG)
}
(7)
subject to∑ng
g=1 PGg =
∑nb
i=1 PDi (λ) (8)
−Pmax 6 PTDF(GBPG − PD +Hc)
6 Pmax (F±)
(9)
PminG 6 PG 6 P
max
G (α
±) (10)
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where the variables:
c is the nb × 1 attack vector;
P is the nbr× 1 vector of physical line power flow;
Pl is the physical power flow of target line l;
PG, P
∗
G are ng × 1 vectors of generation dispatch vari-
ables and optimal generation dispatch solved by
DCOPF, respectively;
λ is the dual variable of the generation-load balance
constraint;
F+, F− are nbr×1 dual variable vectors of the upper and
lower bound of thermal limits, respectively;
α+, α− are ng × 1 dual variable vectors of the upper
and lower bound of generator capacity limits,
respectively;
and the parameters:
LS is the load shift factor;
PD is the nb × 1 vector of active load at each bus;
N0 is the l0-norm constraint integer;
H is the nb×nb dependency matrix between power
injection measurements and state variables;
GB is the nb×ng generator to bus connectivity matrix;
CG is the cost function of the generation vector;
Pmax is the nbr × 1 vector of line thermal limit;
PminG , P
max
G are ng × 1 vectors of minimum and maximum
generator output, respectively;
σ is the weight of the norm of attack vector c.
In the first level objective function, σ is chosen to be a small
positive number to minimize the contribution of the second
term in the objective; constraint (4) calculates the physical
power flow of the system; constraint (5) models the limited
resources that the attacker can use to change states. Ideally,
the l0-norm would be used, giving the exact sparsity of c, but
for tractability we use the l1-norm as a proxy. Constraint (6)
ensures the load changes are small enough to avoid detection.
In the second level, the system response to the attack vector
determined in the first level is modeled via DCOPF as in
(7)−(10).
The bi-level optimization problem introduced above is non-
linear. We modify several constraints to convert the original
formulation into an equivalent MILP as in [8]. The modifica-
tions include:
1) Linearize the l1-norm constraint in (5) by introducing a
slack vector s as
c 6 s, −c 6 s,
∑
i∈Lload
si 6 N1 (11)
where Lload is the set of load buses. Meanwhile, the
objective function (3) becomes
maximize
c,s
Pl − σ
∑
i∈Lload
si (12)
2) Replace the second level DCOPF problem by its KKT
optimality conditions as introduced in [13], as
(8) − (10)
0 = ∇ [CG(PG)] +∇(
ng∑
g=1
PGg −
nb∑
i=1
PDi) · λ
+∇ [PTDF(GBPG − PD +Hc)∓ Pmax] · F±
+∇ (PG − P
max
G ) · α
+ +∇
(
PminG − PG
)
· α−
(13)
0 6 F± (14)
0 6 α± (15)
0 = diag(F±) [PTDF(GBPG − PD +Hc)∓ Pmax]
(16)
0 = diag(α+) (PG − PmaxG ) (17)
0 = diag(α−T )
(
PminG − PG
) (18)
where constraint (13) is the partial gradient optimal
condition, (14) and (15) are the dual feasibility con-
straints, (16)–(18) represent the complementary slackness
constraints.
3) Linearize the complementary slackness constraints in
KKT conditions by introducing new binary variables δ
and a large constant M as
[δ±F ; δ
±
α ] ∈ {0, 1} (19){
F± 6 Mδ±F
Pmax ∓ PTDF(GBPG − PD +Hc) 6 M(1− δ±F )
(20)

α± 6 Mδ±α
PmaxG − PG 6 M(1− δ
+
α )
PG − P
min
G 6 M(δ
−
α − 1)
(21)
The whole problem then becomes a single level MILP with
objective (12), subject to (4), (6), (8)–(11), (13)–(15), and
(19)–(21). Throughout this paper, this problem is denoted
as the original MILP with P ∗l as the optimal objective.
This problem is NP-hard, thus it is not guaranteed that a
solution can be found in polynomial time. As the system
network size scales, the number of binary variables increases,
resulting in an increased computational burden. We have found
experimentally that for the IEEE 118-bus system, the original
MILP fails to converge in a reasonable length of time using
solver GUROBI. Since power systems in the real world are
typically very large (e.g., the PJM system includes 15000
buses, 2800 generators and 20000 branches), a straightforward
approach to solving this problem for real-world systems does
not allow a characterization of the worst-case attacks.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENT ALGORITHMS TO SOLVE
ATTACK OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
In this section, we introduce three computational efficient
algorithms to overcome the computational challenges brought
on by a large number of binary variables. Algorithm 1 (A1)
reduces the number of line thermal limit constraints as well as
the number of binary variables associated with them from the
original MILP. If it converges, the optimal objective P ∗(A1)l
solved with Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to be equal to the
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optimal objective of the original MILP. However, as the system
size scales, even though the number of binary variables associ-
ated with line thermal limit constraints is significantly reduced,
the number of binary variables associated with generation limit
constraints is still large enough to make the problem hard to
solve. As an experimental verification, we note that Algorithm
1 works efficiently for the IEEE 118-bus system, but it fails to
converge in a reasonable length of time for the Polish system
with 2383 buses. Thus, similar to Algorithm 1, we propose
Algorithm 2 (A2), in which we further reduce the number
of generation limit constraints as well as the binary variables
associated with them from the original MILP. Algorithm 2
gives a feasible solution, but the solution can be sub-optimal.
Thus, the resulting objective value P ∗(A2)l is a lower bound
on P ∗l . Finally, we propose Algorithm 3, which maximizes the
difference between the target line cyber and physical power
flows, to evaluate system vulnerability without modeling the
system response to the attack. This reduces to a linear program,
whose optimal solution can be used to derive both a lower
bound P ∗(A3,lb)l and an upper bound P
∗(A3,ub)
l on P
∗
l . A
comparison of these three algorithms is given in Table I.
A. Reducing the Number of Binary Variables Associated with
Line Thermal Limit Constraints
In [14] and [15], the authors suggest that a constraint reduc-
tion technique can be used to accelerate the solving process
for optimization problems for large power systems, such as
unit commitment and security constrained economic dispatch
(SCED). The thermal limit constraints which are likely to be
non-binding at the optimal solution are removed for speed.
In Algorithm 1, we apply a similar method to improve the
efficiency of the original MILP by reducing the number of
binary variables associated with line thermal limits constraints.
For lines whose pre-attack power flow are much lower than
their ratings, their thermal limit constraints are unlikely to be
binding in the optimal solution of the optimization problem,
and hence, can be removed. Thus, we propose Algorithm 1 to
remove constraints from (19) and (20) without violating any
constraints of the original MILP.
Algorithm 1 Attack optimization problem with reduced ther-
mal limit constraints
1) Perform a system wide DCOPF assuming no attack is
present.
2) Let Q be the set of lines whose power flow are more than
90% of ratings (denote as critical lines).
3) For each line k, if k /∈ Q, remove the corresponding
constraints from (9), (13)–(14), (19), and (20).
4) Solve the reduced problem, and use the optimal dispatch
P
∗(A1)
G to calculate the cyber power flow of the system.
5) If there exists any cyber overflow, add those lines to Q,
and go back to 3).
6) Let P ∗(A1)l be the optimal objective value of the reduced
problem.
If the algorithm terminates, the solution is guaranteed to be
the optimal solution of the original MILP (i.e. P ∗(A1)l = P ∗l )
because no thermal limits are violated.
B. Reducing the Number of Binary Variables Associated with
Power Generation Limit Constraints
Algorithm 2 modifies Algorithm 1 by further reducing the
number of binary variables, now focusing on generation limit
constraints. Since constraint (6) ensures the load changes are
small, the generation re-dispatch is likely to be limited within
a small number of generators (denote as marginal generators)
corresponding to these load changes. Algorithm 2 reduces
the number of binary variables associated with generators
by assuming the generation level of non-marginal generators
remains unchanged after attack.
Algorithm 2 Attack optimization problem with reduced ther-
mal limit & generation limit constraints
1) Perform a system wide DCOPF assuming no attack is
present.
2) Let Q be the set of critical lines as defined above.
3) Let R be the set of marginal generators. i.e., the set of
generators g where PminGg < PGg < PmaxGg .
4) For each line k and each generator g, if k /∈ Q and
g /∈ R, remove the corresponding constraints from (9)–
(10), (13)–(15) and (19)–(21).
5) Solve the reduced problem, then take the optimal attack
vector c∗A2 to run post-attack DCOPF (7)–(10) to get
system operator’s corresponding dispatch P postG .
6) If P ∗(A2)G 6= P postG , add those generators with different
dispatch to the set R, and then go back to 4).
7) Take P ∗(A2)G to calculate the cyber power flow of the
system.
8) If there exists any cyber overflow, add those lines to Q,
and go back to 4).
9) Let P ∗(A2)l be the optimal objective value of the reduced
problem.
By significantly reducing the number of binary variables,
Algorithm 2 can be efficiently applied to the Polish system.
Since some of the variables PG are held constant, the solution
is not guaranteed to be optimal for the original MILP. How-
ever, it does provide a feasible solution, and hence, P ∗(A2)l is
a lower bound on P ∗l .
C. Maximizing the Difference between Post-attack Physical
and Cyber Power Flows
In this section, we propose Algorithm 3 that provides both
lower and upper bounds on P ∗l . In the original MILP the
objective is to maximize the physical power flow of a target
line, which is calculated by (4). Substituting (4) into (9) gives
−Pmax − PTDF(Hc) 6 P 6 Pmax − PTDF(Hc). (22)
In particular, for target line l,
Pl 6 P
max
l − PTDF
l(Hc) (23)
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THREE PROPOSED ALGORITHMS
Algorithm Type of Program Outcome Tractable Test Cases
# of Binary Variables Computation Time (s)
118-bus Polish 118-bus Polish
Original MILP MILP Optimal Solution 24-bus 480 6446 - -
Algorithm 1 MILP Optimal Solution 24-bus, 118-bus 122 688 22.04 -
Algorithm 2 MILP Lower Bound 24-bus, 118-bus, Polish (2383-bus) 45 87 1.03 40.41
Algorithm 3 LP Lower & Upper Bounds 24-bus, 118-bus, Polish (2383-bus) - - 0.35 4.57
where Pmaxl is a constant and PTDF
l is the lth row of the
PTDF matrix. Thus, we can maximize −PTDFl(Hc) to find
an upper bound on P ∗l constrained by (4), (6), and (11). This
optimization problem is formulated as
maximize
c,s
− PTDFl(Hc) (24)
subject to (4), (6), (11)
This optimization is a linear program and can be solved
efficiently for large systems.
Algorithm 3 Maximizing the difference between post-attack
physical and cyber power flows
1) Solve optimization problem (24). Let c∗A3 be the resulting
optimal attack vector.
2) Calculate the upper bound as
P
∗(A3,ub)
l = P
max
l − PTDF
l(Hc∗A3). (25)
3) Perform post-attack DCOPF (7)–(10) with c = c∗A3 to
find dispatch P postG .
4) Calculate the lower bound as
P
∗(A3,lb)
l = PTDF
l(GBP
post
G − PD). (26)
Once the optimal objective is reached, P ∗(A3,ub)l , can be
calculated by adding this optimal objective to Pmaxl according
to (23). The system re-dispatch P postG and line cyber power
flow P cyber are achieved by performing post-attack DCOPF
(7)–(10). The resulting physical power flow on the target line,
P
∗(A3,lb)
l , is a lower bound on P ∗l .
Note that if the load shift is too large, it is possible that
the post-attack DCOPF fails to converge. However, since we
keep the load shift small, this situation is beyond the scope of
this paper. Furthermore, if P ∗(A3,ub)l = P
∗(A3,lb)
l , they are the
optimal objective of the original MILP. This is the situation
when
∣∣∣P cyberl
∣∣∣ = Pmaxl , i.e., (9) holds with equality in the
optimal solution of post-attack DCOPF (7)–(10).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we apply algorithms described in Sec. IV to
both the IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish system. As stated
in Sec. IV, Algorithm 1 does not converge in reasonable length
of time for the Polish system. Therefore, only Algorithms 2
and 3 are applied on the Polish system. There are 7 critical
lines prior to the attack in IEEE 118-bus system and 17 in
the Polish system. The number of marginal generators prior
to the attack for the two systems are 15 and 6, respectively.
We exhaustively evaluate vulnerability of these two systems
by targeting all critical lines with load shift constraint LS =
10%. The l1-norm constraint N1 is chosen as [0.1, 1] for the
118-bus system and [0.1, 2] for the Polish system, both with
increment 0.1. GUROBI is utilized as the solver to solve the
optimization problem. Throughout, we use MATLAB R2014a
and MATPOWER package v4.1 to perform the simulation.
A. Computational Efficiency
The computational efficiency improved by Algorithms 1
and 2 are characterized as the reduction in the number of
binary variables. In Table I, the 5th column compares the
average numbers of binary variables of the original MILP,
Algorithm 1, and Algorithm 2 for both test systems. Note
that for the Polish system, the number of binary variables of
Algorithms 1 is theoretical, as Algorithm 1 does not converge
in a reasonable length of time for the Polish system. The
6th column summarizes the average computation time of the
three methods for two typical test cases, i.e., test cases with
target line 104 in 118-bus system and target line 292 in the
Polish system. As one would expect, Algorithm 3, an LP, is
computationally the most efficient among the three proposed
algorithms for both test systems.
B. Results for the IEEE 118-bus System
Figs. 1(a) and (b) illustrate the maximum power flow on
target lines 104 and 141, respectively, in IEEE 118-bus system
using the three different algorithms described in Sec. IV. We
use this system to compare the bounds of Algorithms 2 and 3
to the exact solution provided by Algorithm 1; note, however,
that the optimal solution of Algorithm 1 is not available for the
Polish system. Both figures illustrate that as N1 increase, P ∗l
also increases, and all three algorithms can result in overflow.
Fig. 1(a) shows that for target line with any N1, P ∗(A1)l =
P
∗(A2)
l = P
∗(A3,ub)
l = P
∗(A3,lb)
l = P
∗
l ; that is, all three
algorithms achieve the optimal solution of the original MILP.
Fig. 1(b) shows that for target line 141, P ∗(A3,lb)l < P ∗(A1)l =
P
∗(A2)
l < P
∗(A3,ub)
l , illustrating that P
∗(A3,lb)
l and P
∗(A3,ub)
l
are not always tight bounds on P ∗l . In all scenarios we have
considered, Algorithm 2 yields the optimal solution for the
118-bus system. (This is not true for the Polish system, as
illustrated in Fig. 2.)
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Fig. 1. The maximum power flow v.s. the l1-norm constraint (N1) when
target lines are (a) line 104, and (b) line 141 of IEEE 118-bus system.
C. Results for the Polish System
Results for target lines 292, 4, and 1816 obtained with
Algorithms 2 and 3 are illustrated in Figs. 2(a), (b), and
(c), respectively. We observe that for target line 292, the
upper and lower bounds exactly match, i.e., P ∗(A3,ub)l =
P
∗(A3,lb)
l = P
∗(A2)
l , in the range N1 ∈ [0.1, 1.6], and
therefore, the optimal solutions are reached. For the remaining
cases, our algorithms do not give the optimal solutions, since
P
∗(A3,lb)
l < P
∗(A2)
l < P
∗(A3,ub)
l . For target line 4, we observe
that the upper and lower bounds do not match, but the lower
bound from Algorithm 2 is tighter than that from Algorithm
3, whereas for target line 1816, the opposite is true.
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Fig. 2. The maximum power flow v.s. the l1-norm constraint (N1) when
target lines are (a) line 292, (b) line 4, and (c) line 1816 of the Polish system..
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented an approach to evaluate the vulnerabil-
ity of power systems to FDI attacks irrespective of the size of
the network. Three computationally efficient algorithms have
been introduced to characterize the vulnerability of systems. It
is demonstrated that Algorithm 1 can find worst-case attacks.
Algorithms 2 and 3, on the other hand, can find feasible attacks
that can result in significant consequences. Future work will
include evaluating attack efficiency for arbitrary system size
when attacker only has limited information as in [16] using the
three algorithm proposed here. In addition, designing detection
countermeasures to thwart such attacks is also of interest.
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